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IN THIS ISSUE

THE SHAPE OF THINGS 61

EDITORIALS

Gandhi and the War 63

Nelson's Fourth Try 64

Toward a Break with Vichy *by Freda Kirchwey* 65

ARTICLES

Who Is the State Department? I. Cordell Hull—the Great Anachronism *by Robert Bendiner* 66

Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese *by Albert Horlings* 69

Hitler's Quarreling Puppets *by Eugen Kovacs* 72

Everybody's Business *by Keith Hutchison* 74

In the Wind 75

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

"P'town" *by George Willison* 76

Textbook on Blitzkrieg *by H. S. Sewell* 76

Art Hays *by George Joel* 77

The Correspondent's Book *by Ralph Bates* 78

Drama Note *by F. K.* 79

Music *by B. H. Haggin* 79

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 80

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The Shape of Things

WITHOUT IN THE LEAST MINIMIZING THE gravity of the situation on the eastern front, it is possible to note some encouraging facts. Nowhere is there any sign of demoralization among the Soviet armies. In the extreme south where the flat, treeless steppes afford no natural lines of defense, the Russians are still retreating but in slow orderly fashion. Farther north the bloody struggle for Voronezh continues, and the Germans have been prevented from consolidating their bridgeheads on the Don River just west of the city. There are indications that Marshal Timoshenko is prepared to fall back behind the great bend of the Don, where he can make a real stand in defense of the key city of Stalingrad, which commands the last line of communications between Moscow and the Caucasus. Voronezh and Rostov would form the northern and southern anchors of this line and are therefore points which must be held at all costs. Hitler is evidently giving priority to the Russian battle, and consequently Rommel is getting only limited reinforcements and supplies. The danger to Egypt is not past, but with marked inferiority in the air Rommel can do little at the moment to counter the offensive which is being waged by British and American fliers against his communications.

*

VERBAL APPRECIATION FOR CHINA IS ALL very well, but as Dr. Lin Yutang points out in a letter to the New York *Times*, the Chinese could get along better with fewer bouquets and more bombers. Recent promises made to the Chungking government, he says, are not being fully honored. Thus transport planes, which are vital to China, have been diverted for use in India, while the bombers under General Stilwell's command, which performed effectively against Hankow, have been transferred to the Middle East. Meanwhile, despite its lack of effective weapons, the Chinese army is continuing its struggle to hold Chekiang and Kiangsi. After an occupation of only six days the Japanese were driven out of the important seaport of Wenchow. And their newly won hold on the Hangchow-Namchang railroad has been broken by the Chinese recapture of a fifteen-mile stretch between Iyang and Hengfeng. Creditable as these achievements are to the

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Chinese army, it seems probable that the relaxation of Japan's grip in this sector is at least partly due to withdrawals of troops which are being sent northward.

*

REINFORCEMENT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY IN northern Manchuria, together with reports of concentrations near the borders of Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia, suggests that a sudden blow against eastern Siberia may be at hand. With the Red Army hard-pressed to defend the Caucasus from the Nazis, Tokyo may well feel that a stab in the back is in order. Are we prepared to aid Russia to resist a Japanese offensive? We have a vital interest in keeping Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Peninsula out of Japanese hands, for these are the best possible bases for an aerial offensive once Japan decides to take the risk of adding Russia to its list of enemies. By their occupation of the western Aleutians the Japanese have placed themselves in a position to interfere with our direct line of communications with eastern Siberia. Is the navy taking all possible measures to drive the invaders out before they establish fully equipped bases? Are any alternative routes being prepared? Are bases being constructed so that bombers can fly across the Bering Strait and thence to Vladivostok? Has any effort been made to open up communications with Russia by the Arctic sea route, which can be kept free with the aid of ice-breakers during the next two months? We ask these questions, knowing that military secrecy properly prohibits any answers, as a reminder to our strategists not to minimize the possibilities of the northwestern passages to Asia.

*

FOR THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES RATHER THAN the solution it offers, we are glad to print in this issue the article by Albert Horlings on "Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese." On the face of things it is hard to explain why the Japanese of California and Oregon have to be moved inland while a far greater number are allowed to remain at what the author rightly describes as "the anchor of the whole Pacific battle line." Perhaps it is the very size of Hawaii's Japanese population that discourages mass evacuation. The Hawaiians themselves, including those of mixed racial stock, are a minority, numbering only some 63,000, as are the whites on the islands, numbering 108,000. Even assuming the shipping facilities for the project, the question of where 150,000 transplanted men and women could be located and what they could do to sustain themselves assumes staggering proportions. We cannot help thinking, moreover, that removal of more than one-third of the population would have a deeper effect on the islands' economy than Mr. Horlings is willing to grant. With internment at least equally difficult, the question remains dangerously unresolved.

GENERALISSIMO FRANCO CELEBRATED THE sixth anniversary of the fascist rebellion in Spain with a speech calculated to discourage his most persistent well-wishers in Whitehall and Washington. First, he admitted the existence of active opposition inside the country; second, he said that opposition or no opposition, Spain could mobilize an army of 3,000,000 men to fight communism, which was the only great problem facing Europe; and third, he ridiculed the "liberal, democratic form of government," asserting that the totalitarian system had proved its superiority both in peace and war. What is the answer of our policy-makers in Washington and London to this sort of talk? Do they really believe they can still win or buy Franco away from his open allegiance to fascism and the Axis? As the policy of appeasement crumbles to nothing in France, why does not our government for once act with decision? Let us take Franco at his word and accept him as the enemy he openly proclaims himself. A break with fascist Spain would not only be like a breath of fresh air in a sick-room; it would also serve the practical purpose of making possible a thoroughgoing campaign against the Phalanx, which today operates unchecked throughout Latin America in the service of Hitler.

*

THERE CAN BE NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT the equity of the formula adopted by the War Labor Board for the national stabilization of wages. But the claim of William H. Davis, chairman of the board, that it will "lead to a 'terminal' for the tragic race between wages and prices" seems unduly optimistic. In fact, unless implementation of the new formula is accompanied by other measures aiming directly at the curtailment of purchasing power, the present trend toward inflation must be intensified. The first principle adopted by the board is that the purchasing power of a worker's hourly wage on January 1, 1941, ought to be maintained. Before this date, it is pointed out, there had been a long period of comparatively stable prices, but since then the cost of living has advanced 15 per cent. Thus wage advances to the same percentage are justified in order to maintain established pre-war standards. Unfortunately we have to face the fact that we cannot maintain the flow of civilian goods and services available on January 1, 1941, and hence if some income receivers are able to maintain their standard of consumption at that date, it must be at the expense of others who do not enjoy the protection of wage stabilization. Nor can it be argued that the necessary reduction in consumption can be made entirely at the expense of people in the higher income brackets. There are not enough of them—even if all incomes over, say, $5,000 a year, were confiscated—to take up the slack between national money income and national income in terms of consumable goods. If the WLB formula, therefore, is not to spur on inflation,

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there will have to be much more drastic taxation than anything yet contemplated by Congress, the Treasury, or the public. Actually this would be the best way of securing equality of sacrifice, but to be fully effective the burden on all classes of taxpayers would have to be staggering.

*

WE HOPE AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION will be made by the Truman committee of the Maritime Commission's cancelation of its contracts with the Higgins Corporation of New Orleans for 200 Liberty ships. Although the cancelation is supposed to be based on a new general policy of allocating no more steel for ship-plant construction, it is curious and it may be significant that the Higgins yards are the only ones affected. Higgins and Henry Kaiser have been putting the conventional big shipbuilding companies like Bethlehem to shame with their mass-production methods and speedy deliveries, and Bethlehem exercises much power behind the closed doors of the Maritime Commission. "Maybe," Higgins said when he heard the news, "we were going to build ships too fast, maybe we were going to build too many ships and too cheaply." It seems strange that our most efficient shipbuilders should have the greatest trouble with the Maritime Commission and the dollar-a-year men—Kaiser has had plenty of headaches, too. We should like to know (1) just how far behind schedule Bethlehem and the other big yards are; (2) why some of their work can't be shifted to these smaller, faster yards; and (3) how long the WPB and the Maritime Commission intend to keep silent on the detailed suggestions made recently by Philip Murray and the steel workers for increasing, with existing facilities, the output of both steel plate for ships and armor plate for tanks.

*

DAVID B. VAUGHAN'S LIBEL SUIT AGAINST Martin Dies has hit the gentleman from Texas where it evidently hurts most, to wit, the pocket. Mr. Dies didn't mind apologizing on the floor of the House to avoid the short end of a $75,000 legal battle; he didn't even mind admitting that his scatterbrained committee had libeled Mr. Vaughan on no more evidence than the appearance of another Vaughn's name on a letterhead. On the contrary, he appears to be looking forward to other suits and wants to be prepared. It's not the principle of the thing that worries him but the few cents. Presenting a bill to Congress for $611 to cover legal expenses incurred so far, he asks for "an expression of policy" as to whether he or the people of the United States should bear the costs of his carelessness and flair for slander. We hope there is in Congress a man with pepper enough to give Mr. Dies the "expression of policy" which he needs—and which he hasn't had since Texas rated him a bad fourth in a four-man race for the Senate.

Gandhi and the War

ALONG the eastern frontiers of India the rainy season is still a bar to campaigning. But the Japanese conquerors of Burma are consolidating their positions there, and aerial reconnaissance has established the presence of troop concentrations which portend a serious attempt to invade India. Nevertheless, the Working Committee of the All-India National Congress, meeting at Wardha, has been concerned with the problem of pushing out the British rather than of keeping out the Japanese. After many days of discussion it adopted a long resolution which in effect threatened a campaign of non-violent disobedience unless British rule in India was ended immediately.

Although Gandhi has spoken of the resolution, which has still to be ratified by the All-India Congress Committee, as "open rebellion," that threat is implicit rather than explicit. But the resolution makes demands which no British government could accept at this time unless it were prepared to withdraw completely from India and to cease to interest itself in the war in Asia. There is hardly need to speculate on the outcome of such an action for India itself, for China, and for the cause of the United Nations as a whole.

It is true that the Congress disclaims any desire to embarrass Britain or its allies in their prosecution of the war or to encourage Japanese aggression. The proposal for the withdrawal of British power from India does not, the resolution declares, mean the physical withdrawal of Britons, and Congress would be agreeable to the stationing of Allied armed forces in India. But to what civil authority would the commander of such forces be responsible? And what would be the position of the Indian army itself, the backbone of the present defense of India? Would it operate independently under the authority of a provisional Indian government or remain under the control of a commander-in-chief responsible to London? The Congress resolution does not even touch upon these crucial questions.

To the difficulty of achieving a unified command under these circumstances there would almost certainly be added disunity in the rear of the most explosive kind. The All-India Congress, although the largest and most inclusive political body in the country, is bitterly opposed by other organizations—the most important being the Moslem League—which are too powerful to be ignored. The Wardha resolution professes to believe that once foreign domination is ended unity can be established in a degree that will make possible the solution of all internal problems "on a mutual and agreed basis." It is noteworthy, however, that this thesis has been hotly challenged by the Moslem League, which declares that Congress, far from doing its utmost, as it claimed, to settle

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the communal question, hounded its former Madras leader, C. R. Rajagopalachari, from the organization when he attempted to supply a formula. Though many Moslems support Congress, Moslem fear of a Hindu-dominated central government is acute enough to provoke violence should the British withdraw from India leaving the minorities question as unfinished business.

Reports from London suggest that the British government has no intention of yielding any ground. But while it is possible to agree that it can neither accept the demands of Congress nor permit the defense of India to be undermined by civil disobedience, it is necessary to ask for a stronger British renunciation of post-war imperialism. It is clear that Indian nationalists are intensely suspicious of Britain's good faith, and their suspicions are fortified by the attitude of powerful groups among the British Tories. Yet, as Nehru says in an article in the New York *Times Magazine* of July 18, Western domination of Asia cannot possibly outlast the war, and any attempt to reestablish the old relationships must result in another disastrous conflict. It follows that if irrepressible conflict inside India is to be averted, some way must be found of reinforcing the British promise of post-war independence. Nothing less than a joint guaranty by the United Nations of freedom for India is likely to carry enough weight.

Nelson's Fourth Try

FIFTY per cent of America's industrial capacity lies in its small factories and machine shops, and we shall not achieve the total effort required by a total war until they are brought into war production. The latest of many efforts to do so is the Smaller War Plants Corporation, whose five-man board of directors has just been named by Donald M. Nelson. We are sorry to say that we think it will take a maximum of public pressure to get a minimum of results from this body. There are three things wrong with the new setup. One is the Smaller War Plants Corporation Act itself. The second is Nelson. The third is the kind of board he has picked to run the corporation.

The Smaller War Plants Act, outgrowth of the Murray-Patman bill, represents more than an attempt to help small business. It represents the first effort to plan war production on total lines. It directs the chairman of the War Production Board to make a complete inventory of America's productive resources and then to take various steps toward spreading war work among all available plants. But these basic directives for an all-out industrial mobilization are to be carried out "whenever and to the extent that he [Nelson] determines such action to be necessary." The new corporation is expected to farm out prime contracts among small businesses, but it cannot obtain the contracts until Nelson issues a certificate to the Secretary of War or Navy declaring the SWPC competent to perform the contract. The corporation is also intended to finance small businesses engaged in war work, a task Jesse Jones has signally failed to perform, but after it has made a loan the loan is to be serviced and administered by Jones. This will leave the small producer financially at the mercy of a man who has never shown the slightest sympathy for little business.

The effectiveness of the act will depend in large part upon Nelson's willingness and ability to carry out instructions. Judging from his past record and present utterances, we fear he will make little effort to operate the SWPC as it was intended to be operated. Nelson has had three opportunities before this to bring little business into the war program. The first was under the old Defense Commission, when he was in charge of spreading work to the smaller plants but neither achieved that purpose nor convincingly explained why he failed. He had his second opportunity as executive director of the SPAB and priorities director of the OPM. These twin jobs gave him enormous power to energize the Plant Site Board and force the army and navy to stop building new plants and encourage the conversion of existing facilities and the spread of orders among small concerns. He accomplished little in this line, although if he had been successful, we should have been saved in part from the present shortage of materials. Nelson's third opportunity to spread war work came when, as chairman of the War Production Board, he was given authority over army-navy procurement. He had the power then to force big-business-minded brass hats to distribute the orders among small businesses, but he never had the force or determination to use that power effectively.

The job facing the Smaller War Plants Corporation is one that calls for men of great energy and capacity. They will face a hostile requirements committee for materials and a hostile army-navy procurement for orders. Of the five men picked by Nelson for the job, four are nonentities. Lou E. Holland, the deputy chairman, is the one man on the new board who has shown perseverance and organizing ability in dealing with the problem. He organized the Kansas City pool. Not a single engineer like Morris Llewellyn Cooke or S. T. Henry went on the board. Dynamic business men like Charles Schwartzbaugh of Toledo, organizer of the Toledo pool, were passed over for men no one ever heard of before. Peter R. Nehemkis, the dynamo and brains of the Contract Distribution Division under Odlum, another outstanding candidate, was also rejected. It is as if Nelson had deliberately picked a weak board.

Nelson says we have not enough materials to give work to small business, and this may be an obstacle to new contracts. But what about breaking down and spreading out existing contracts now buried under the backlogs

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of big business? It takes no more material to do work in a small plant than in a big factory. And idle small plants can turn out the work faster than overloaded big ones.

Toward a Break with Vichy

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

THE dismal farce of America's relations with Vichy totters toward its predestined end, not through any sudden, belated access of realism on the part of the State Department but rather through the will of the German High Command and its agent, Pierre Laval. Our appeasement policy had no substance to start with other than the will to believe of a set of reactionary, tradition-ridden officials supported by the hesitation of their procrastinating chief. The history of our dalliance with Pétain's government is not unlike the history of other senile love affairs; it failed for lack of the necessary source of vital energy. The whole relationship has been a fraud, somewhat perverse, totally impotent.

The record of its last days is worth recalling for whatever lesson it may carry, though one begins to grow cynical about the value of demonstrations.

Having failed to win a single important concession from the day our government astounded the French people and even many French officials and high army officers by recognizing Pétain, State Department officials betrayed genuine annoyance when Laval was raised to power and publicly taken to the old Marshal's bosom. They had counted upon Pétain's widely advertised contempt for Laval—which means that they had counted upon his independence in the face of Nazi pressure. They resented Laval and said so. Perhaps they vaguely and uneasily recalled Hindenburg and Hitler.

In any case, relations with Vichy grew tense. Talk of the necessity of taking over Martinique—newspaper talk—was discounted at the State Department, but presently it was announced that negotiators had been sent to discuss the situation with Admiral Robert, Vichy's viceroy for the Caribbean. The negotiations were presented as a slap at Laval. We were by-passing him and dealing directly with the governor of the islands. This was the theory, and it was generally welcomed as evidence of a first retreat from appeasement.

The only trouble was it didn't work. Admiral Robert publicly announced that he was referring every proposal made by the United States to his government and that he would carry out Vichy's orders to the letter. Laval, through Robert, agreed to the disarming of the French warships at Martinique but refused other American demands. The negotiations were a failure, especially as a demonstration of our disapproval of Vichy, and when they were over, Robert broadcast a full and contemptuous repudiation of America's attempt to "bribe" him into disloyalty to his government.

Then came the fiasco over the French warships at Alexandria. Secretary Hull opened with a simple diplomatic lie—uttered, I am sorry to say, on the Fourth of July, a day sacred to the legend of the Cherry Tree. He denied flatly a report from Vichy that the American chargé d'affaires, S. Pinkney Tuck, had proposed that the French ships be moved to some port outside the area of operations. But on July 11 Vichy reported that Mr. Tuck had "reopened" with M. Laval the question of the French warships. (By this time the pretense that we were no longer dealing with Laval had been abandoned.) And on July 12 the Vichy government rejected the United States proposals, a fact that was admitted two days later by Under Secretary Welles in a statement describing the failure of the negotiations and expressing his confidence that the French people would consider the proposals very much in their interest. This touch indicated that disillusionment had not yet knocked appeasement out of the ring. But the publication by Laval of "essential parts" of the notes exchanged between Vichy and Washington showed that neither the French people nor their interests had played any role at all in the negotiations, while the German Supreme Command had fully approved Vichy's orders to the French forces in Alexandria.

Meanwhile the United States had drawn closer to De Gaulle, recognizing his position as leader of the Fighting French and appointing attachés to consult with the French National Committee in London. Thus the exigencies of war and the decisions of the German Armistice Commission combined to reduce the structure of appeasement to a shambles. That trouble may still lurk in the ruins is of course evident. For one thing, until we break off relations with Vichy fully and legally, the State Department will always find reasons for delaying or refusing to perform necessary acts of war. It is obvious that the United Nations forces in Egypt should not destroy the ships Laval has refused to hand over; they should seize them and use them. Why should good warships be sunk while the United Nations suffer for lack of them? They should be taken over by the Fighting French and manned by Frenchmen. But would such an obvious and realistic act be approved by our State Department? I'm afraid not. Instead, if the day comes when Alexandria is threatened, it will nod solemn approval while the British scuttle good ships and the Germans blaze their way eastward. What is total war compared with the niceties of even the most tenuous diplomatic relations?

Never mind, things are moving toward a break with Vichy. It will come in Hitler's own time, as did our break with Japan. And then, perhaps, we can fight on the side of our allies instead of our enemies.

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Who Is the State Department?

I. CORDELL HULL—THE GREAT ANACHRONISM

BY ROBERT BENDINER

[*This is the first of a series of articles on the men who head that most anonymous of all American government agencies, the Department of State. Based on chapters of the author's forthcoming book, "The Riddle of the State Department," this series is offered not as a review of American foreign policy, which is discussed in* The Nation *from week to week, but rather as a survey of the backgrounds and philosophies which have shaped the conduct of the department's personnel.*]

THERE are no devils in the State Department. There are villains in the piece, but they are as impersonal, as anonymous, as cold as the department itself. Chief of these is the dead weight of tradition. Other agencies of the government in varying degrees reflect the times, but the faded and moth-eaten tradition of Victorian diplomacy seeps out of every cranny in the antiquated home of the State Department. It is a code of elegant cynicism, of tactical shrewdness that has small relevance beyond the horizons of the chessboard. Above all, it is a code of rules, of amorality within the prescribed bounds of international law. It isn't what you do that counts but how you play the game.

The diplomatic tradition once had its uses, but it belongs to an era of war between nations, and ours happens to be an era of war between ideas. The patriotism of the men of the State Department is unquestioned, but theirs is a loyalty to the United States as a nation among nations, not as an embattled democracy whose allies could never include states committed to the death of democracy. If our policy-makers had ever thought in these terms, they would not have tolerated the strangulation of one after another of our potential allies at the hands of our potential enemies. Nor would they have squandered time, money, and hope in endeavors to win over to our side men who had proclaimed their faith in a totalitarian world. They would have known how to tell America's friends from its enemies.

But the men of the State Department do not think in terms such as these, thrown up by the exigencies of a changing world. Their background, their schooling, their personal beliefs and family connections, their economic and social standing—all tend in the main to reduce democracy to an abstraction in the first place and, beyond that, to breed a disbelief in change, a suspicion of new formulations. The social origins of the State Department's personnel constitute only one factor in a whole complex of factors, but it is a highly important one. To some extent the traditions of an institution like the State Department mold the minds of its personnel regardless of their original predilections, but to a far greater extent the institution tends to attract—and select—men who might be expected to respond to those traditions.

These remarks are pertinent to the department's personnel as a whole. Having made them, we shall start with the exception that proves the rule.

Cordell Hull typifies the diplomat probably less than any other man in his Department of State. He claims no aristocratic forbears, spent his youth in parts physically and culturally remote from the halls of Groton and Harvard, and enjoys nothing resembling a private fortune. Even today he and his wife do an extreme minimum of entertaining and have almost no part in the social whirl that figures so largely in the lives of his subordinates. Making political capital of his back-country origins, the Secretary's champions are prone to swing too far in the other direction and put Hull in the log-cabin, poverty-stricken-youth tradition of Lincoln. Actually his father was a well-to-do Tennessee farmer and timberman, and while young Hull did a turn at rafting logs down the Obey River, he also had the benefits of such higher education as the region provided. After two years at National Normal University at Lebanon, Ohio, he put in a year at the Cumberland University Law School and emerged at twenty a member of the Tennessee bar. At twenty-two he was a representative in the state legislature, and after serving as captain of a volunteer infantry regiment in the Spanish-American War he was appointed to the bench at the age of thirty-two. Four years later, in 1907, he went to Congress, and aside from a single defeat in the Republican landslide in 1920, he served steadily in the House until 1931, when he was elected to the Senate. The two-year gap in his Congressional record he filled in as chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Thus when Cordell Hull was asked by President Roosevelt to head his Cabinet he had behind him twenty-six years of Washington politics. Most of them were dedicated to a single thesis, to wit, that an equitable tariff policy on the part of all nations, leading ultimately to freedom of trade throughout the world, is the only

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basis of a lasting peace. To his credit, Hull's Congressional record shows that, in addition, he fathered the first federal income-tax legislation and the federal inheritance-tax law of 1916, both bold and progressive measures. But as he himself fondly recalls, most of his years in the House of Representatives were spent in struggling against the tariff, "the king of all our evils."

If Cordell Hull had become Secretary of State ten years earlier he might conceivably have altered the shape of things to come. His theories of a peaceful world based on free trade would not have been quite so archaic in those pre-fascist days as his critics regard them today. The props might have been taken from under Europe's incipient fascists, and the fierce nationalism on which they fed deprived of its most cogent appeal, if hope had been held out to the peoples of Europe and Asia that a world without trade barriers was in the making, a world in which sly barter deals and imperial conquest would be unnecessary because each nation, economically, would have the wide world for its *Lebensraum*. But great volumes of water had poured over the dam between 1923 and the day Hull became Secretary of State—and considerable blood as well. By 1933 fascism was firmly in the saddle, and *Lebensraum* was seen to be what it always had been—the sheerest pretext for the drive to power of the most rapacious movement that ever afflicted an ailing society. What Hitler has done to the Czechs, the Poles, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the French, the Greeks, and even the Italians is a revelation of the purposes fascism had reserved for its *Lebensraum*. They are purposes that have as little in common with Hull's freedom from tariffs as the purposes of a tiger have with freedom of religion.

No one ever has imputed or ever could impute to Cordell Hull the faintest sympathies for fascism. Aside from his typically American abhorrence of dictatorship, he perceived early enough that fascism, with its economic autarchy and international anarchy, was wholly incompatible with his dream of free trade and universal amity. Unfortunately the necessary treatment seemed to him almost as distasteful as the disease. Embargoes, boycotts, and other economic sanctions and "measures short of war" conflicted almost as much as fascism itself with his notions of attaining peace through commerce. They implied, moreover, an increase in government control over private business which so staunch a believer in laissez faire could hardly contemplate with satisfaction. From the start Hull found himself in a dilemma. To ignore the rise of fascism entirely, or to countenance its illicit gains, meant ultimately a world in which imperialist exploitation would be immensely advanced and free trade reduced to a minimum. On the other hand, to combat it effectively, to prevent it from ever attaining the strength necessary to make war, meant a serious retrogression in the particular process for achieving world peace which he had so earnestly cultivated for a quarter of a century.

Instinctively Hull moved toward compromise, procrastination, and wishful thinking. Everything that could be done to discourage fascism without imperiling his grand scheme became the essence of his approach. Castigations, moral homilies, and other verbal sanctions against the fascist states flowed endlessly, but whenever American action was taken its results were quickly mitigated, stopped short of effectiveness. The door was often closed halfway, but it was never slammed shut. Always there was hope that by threats here and promises there the fascists could be brought around and fitted into a scheme of informal cooperation that would finally blunt the edge of their sword and remove their incentive to aggression. Hull made it clear again and again that however much the United States might disapprove of the conduct of the aggressors, it did not consider them beyond redemption and stood ready to cooperate with them at the first sign of reform. Embargoes were always semi-embargoes, collective sanctions were scrupulously shunned—and always the promise of a glorious era of flourishing trade was held out if only the bad boys of fascism would see the light and enter the comity of nations. If the Hull policy was the appeasement of a nineteenth-century liberal rather than that of a Cliveden Tory, it was appeasement none the less, and in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo it had the same effect.

Secretary of State Hull

The present Secretary of State will never go down in history as a great executive. From the start he addressed himself to certain chosen areas of operation, and for the rest delegated authority with a freedom that amounted almost to indifference. He is said, in fact, to have made his acceptance of the post conditional on his absolute freedom from personnel problems and responsibilities. In his chosen fields, however, Hull has tenaciously followed his own bent and bowed to no one. He has influenced the President as much as the President has influenced him. When Roosevelt, at the instance of Raymond Moley, exploded the London economic conference which Hull was hopefully nursing along, the new Secretary of State might well have resigned. Certainly he was seething enough, and privately he dug deep

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into the rich vein of profanity which he has at his disposal for such occasions. But instead of walking out in a huff he waited. It was Moley who resigned in the end, and Hull's economic internationalism became the theoretical keystone of the Roosevelt foreign policy.

The Secretary's chosen fields include principally the development of the Good Neighbor policy, Far Eastern relations, Vichy, and the promulgation of a long series of trade agreements. The last of these is closest to his heart and has probably received the greatest share of his administrative attention. The result is that the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, under Harry C. Hawkins, has established itself as a model of efficiency. With upward of twenty trade agreements to its credit, some containing as many as 3,000 items, this division has dispensed with languorous socialites, and until the war all but nullified its efforts it was probably the hardest-working unit of the department.

Next to the trade agreements, Hull's most solid achievement has been the cultivation of a Good Neighbor policy in soil that once sustained only Dollar Diplomacy and, before that, Manifest Destiny. Hull shares credit for the evolution of the Good Neighbor policy principally with Sumner Welles and Laurence Duggan, not to mention the President himself, but without the personal confidence he has inspired it is questionable whether the more solid work of others would have achieved the measure of success it has. It was Hull who went to Montevideo in 1933 and, uninstructed, laid down the principles of the Good Neighbor to an understandingly skeptical Pan-American assembly. On arriving in the Uruguayan capital he proceeded at once, hat in hand, to call personally on the heads of the other delegations. Gone were the arrogance and the patronizing attitude that had always characterized Washington's representatives at those hollow gatherings. Similarly at Lima, five years later, it was Hull who so impressed the delegates with his humility and genuinely democratic demeanor that street crowds cheered him as *el Apostol* and hailed him as the living symbol of the Good Neighbor. Again it was Hull who negotiated the trade agreements with the Latin American countries, including notably the one with Argentina, in which the United States made tariff concessions on eighty-four items of Argentine export. These agreements were concrete manifestations of good-will as well as good business. Together with the extremely favorable impression left by Hull, they went far to wear down the distrust of the United States bred in the Latin American bone by generations of Yankee imperialism.

The success of the Good Neighbor policy measured in terms of hemispheric unity in the war is far-reaching, the defection of Argentina notwithstanding. As an experiment in genuine international cooperation, the kind that must rest ultimately on a solid foundation of democracy and mutual regard, the dimensions of its success are less imposing. Collaboration with a tyrant like Vargas of Brazil—who scorns "the sterile demagogy of political democracy" and has more than once hailed the "virile" dictatorships—or with a fascist-minded autocrat like Castillo is hardly on a moral plane above collaboration with Vichy. But diplomatically, geographically, historically, and almost every other way the relationships are too different to admit of glib comparison, and even by the harshest critics of the Administration the Good Neighbor policy must be put down as a major step toward decent international relations in the Americas.

Beyond the trade agreements and the doctrine of the Good Neighbor, the record of American foreign policy over the past ten years does Hull small credit. From the failure to stand up to Mussolini in the Ethiopian affair, through the scandalous treatment of the government of the Spanish Republic, to the systematic feeding of the Japanese war machine right down to Pearl Harbor, it is a record of perilous caution, of evasion, and of paralyzing contradictions. The temporizing that marked its course was not deliberately employed in order to "buy time" in which to prepare for a showdown; on the contrary it was the recourse of those who lived always in hope that the crisis would evaporate and the showdown forever be averted.

Thus toward Japan Hull adopted what he called a "middle-of-the-road" policy, something between the extremes of abandoning American interests in China and taking necessary measures to protect them. When he returned from South America in 1936 he privately called the Spanish embargo, invoked in his absence, "the worst act of the Roosevelt Administration," but it was he who in the end was to bury the last chance of its repeal. His icy letter to Senator Pittman, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, explained that the Spanish struggle had become more than a civil war because other countries had intervened behind a cloak of "non-intervention" and in the circumstances the United States must do nothing to upset the balance of forces lest it run the risk of retaliatory action by the "non-interveners." In effect, what the Secretary of State said was that we could do nothing to help the Spanish government because Hitler and Mussolini had said no.

As late as April 25, 1939, a month after the rape of Prague, Hull could still bring himself to tell a Red Cross convention: "We hope devoutly that a negotiated peace before rather than after the senseless arbitrament of war . . . will be the happy lot of mankind." To be sure, he wanted a just peace rather than another Munich, but it is a testimonial to his ingenuousness that he could even then think in terms of a just peace with Nazism.

Indeed, no one appeared to be more surprised and disconcerted at each stage of fascist treachery than Hull, and his bitter recriminations have had a hurt and innocent quality that is strange to the cynical traditions of

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diplomacy. His upbraiding of Kurusu, the special envoy sent from Tokyo to discuss peace while Japanese bombers were being readied for Pearl Harbor, was typical of this outraged faith. His earnest and simple belief in the distinction between the Pétain-Darlan clique and that of Pierre Laval was similarly doomed to disillusionment, though the final rupture with Vichy has not yet come about. Ambassador Henry-Haye enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary long after most of Washington looked upon the collaborationist envoy with a jaundiced eye. Until the restoration of Laval, Hull received Henry-Haye frequently, both in his office and less formally at his home, to the mounting discomfort of the United Nations diplomatic corps. Henry-Haye worked assiduously on the Secretary's weak spot, impressing him with the contribution that a befriended Vichyite regime might make to a free-trade world after the war, and Hull's irritable outburst when the Free French seized the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon was a measure of the lengths to which he was prepared to go to nurse along this fruitless connection with the regime of the old Marshal.

Officials of the department have privately admitted that the wording of the protest over the seizure—especially the allusion to the "so-called Free French ships"—was unfortunate, and one of them explained that the Secretary used the qualifying phrase only because the news report that the ships were part of the Free French fleet had not yet been officially confirmed. This explanation, while not entirely convincing, was considerably more understandable than the Secretary's own attempt at clarification, which had it that the term "so-called" referred not to the Free French but to the ships.

In his motivations the idealistic, salty, stubborn Secretary of State stands head and shoulders above most of his department colleagues. If he has often been proved wrong by events, it is no more than just to insist that his mistakes be assessed against the background of a country and a Congress which chose by and large to ignore unpleasant realities. Nevertheless, even in a democracy an obligation rests upon the leaders to see farther and more truly than the led. In his nearly ten years as Secretary of State, the longest tenure in the history of the post, Hull has maintained an unbroken silence on everything that has not borne intimately on his department. In one of the most controversial Administrations of American history the ranking Cabinet officer has never expressed himself on domestic issues that have shaken the country. He is a specialist and has the specialist's scorn for stepping outside his own province. At a time when the foreign policy of every nation is more surely an extension of its domestic policy than has ever been true in the past, that trait in a world figure is less laudable than it might be in other circumstances. Cordell Hull's vision, limited by the boundaries of a laissez faire Utopia, has been inadequate to the task of checking the advance of fascism. In all charity, it is likely to be less adequate for the problems of a world that will have passed through the revolutionary fires of World War II.

[*"The Old Welles and the New" is the subject of the second article of this series, to appear next week.*]

Hawaii's 150,000 Japanese

BY ALBERT HORLINGS

THE United States is making one of the most dramatic bets of history in Hawaii. It is gambling the internal stability of its greatest base in the Pacific—the anchor of the whole Pacific battle line—on the loyalty of 150,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans, 40,000 of whom are aliens, the majority of whom cannot read or speak English, and few of whom have ever seen America or have a clear understanding of what America stands for.

This is no mean wager. A Japanese fifth column in Hawaii could do great damage during an attempted invasion. It could halt civilian transportation, block highways, destroy the vulnerable reservoirs upon which Honolulu depends for water, wreck gas and electric service, destroy food, and terrorize civilians. By diverting man-power from the exterior defenses this fifth column could turn defeat for the invader into success. Sabotage would be easy for it; the Japanese population is 40 per cent of the total, and its members hold hundreds of strategic positions in public utilities, in civilian defense, and in other services.

We might deserve praise for risking so much on the human heart if only we were not making the bet for the wrong reasons. I suspect we are making it not because the military authorities in Hawaii really trust the Japanese but because (1) pressure has been brought on them, and (2) they have been told that the economic life of the islands will collapse without the Japanese. Hawaiian business men are variously motivated, but some of them appear to favor a liberal policy toward the Japanese simply because they favor business as usual. And in the background hovers the case for Hawaiian statehood. The Japanese in Hawaii have long been held up to the mainland as first-class Americans by those pressing for

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the island's admission to the Union, and many islanders fear that to cast doubt on Japanese loyalty now would ruin the chances of admission. The real conviction of the white islanders is shown by the large-scale evacuation of women and children that has been going on ever since Pearl Harbor.

In this historic gamble we have certainly something to win. First, we can win the confidence of some good citizens of ours. Japanese communities in this country have in general realized that their members could never blend physically into the American stream, and so far they have shown no evidence of wanting to be anything but a Japanese colony abroad. But a few individuals in these communities, in Hawaii and in the states, have become truly Americanized in spirit, and it would be a tragedy if they were discriminated against by measures aimed at Japanese who merely live here. No one who knows the able, spirited, and likable American of Japanese ancestry will underestimate the contribution these people can make to American life once they choose—and once we permit them—to turn irrevocably to the West.

We gain something also by admitting that Hawaii has handled its peculiar racial problem sensibly and well, and by refusing unnecessarily to disturb the islands' equilibrium. Sociologically and genetically we have everything to win. Hawaii is one of the great anthropological laboratories of the world, and it would be easy to arouse antipathies that would destroy its value. The racial *aloha* of the islands is a real and priceless thing.

But the greatest thing we stand to gain is the aid of hundreds of millions of people whose skins are not the color of ours. Whether we win or lose the peace will probably depend greatly upon our success in convincing Asiatics, Indians, Negroes, and others that our plea for world leadership is not a screen for world domination. We must convince them that we are fighting not for an Anglo-Saxon world or a Caucasian world, but for a world in which humanity is the test of franchise.

However, our kindness to enemy aliens and enemy sympathizers at a naval outpost will avail us little so long as we needlessly affront our friends. The propaganda value of extraordinary solicitude for Hawaii's Japanese —and it is certainly extraordinary measured by Japanese and German standards, as well as by our own past performance—will be completely nullified unless we mend our manners. A Chinese seaman who was on our side years before the State Department know which was our side is prohibited from coming ashore at an American port. And if it is true that an exclusion law aimed at all Orientals arouses more resentment than good treatment of enemy-alien Orientals can ever undo, then we must wonder whether we have not put the Honolulu cart before the Washington horse.

In any case Hawaii's safety is not a local matter, and a decision relating to control of a possible fifth column must be determined by national interests. How does our present policy look from that point of view? I am afraid that it looks crazy. I never found anyone in Honolulu, not even the most enthusiastic member of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, who would say that Hawaii's Japanese were overwhelmingly loyal to the United States. Why should they be, and why should they want us to win this war?

The political and economic fortunes of a few depend upon our winning. Some have been released from stark poverty by living under the American flag. Some have washed away the stain of ostracism that attached to their family in Japan. Some believe that America's accent upon the worth of the individual will lead to greater happiness for themselves and the world. A few would rather see a defeated Japan than a militaristic one. Some have deeply rooted prejudices and sentiments binding them to our side.

But the proportion of these is not large. The majority have nothing to gain by the defeat of Japan. Their prestige as expatriates depends in large part upon the prestige of the Japanese empire. Their economic fortunes are often tied more closely to Japan than to America: they work for Tokyo banks and business houses; they import goods from Japan; they invest in Japanese securities. Even if they live entirely off Hawaiian land or its surrounding waters, their customers are likely to be members of their own race. When they work for the white man, it is in a menial position, one that is more likely to arouse resentment than regard. To a remarkable degree Hawaii's Japanese are untouched by American ways; all their pride of race, family, and religion binds them to Japan. Thousands see or hear almost nothing American, while they consume Japanese food, Japanese clothing, Japanese music, Japanese pictures, Japanese newspapers and magazines by the shipload.

In common with all the other races there, the Japanese love their purple islands, but they can imagine Hawaii without American rule. Indeed, Japanese propaganda has frequently drawn the picture for them. Instead of doing menial labor at the low end of a double wage standard, they would occupy lofty positions in the economic life of the islands. Instead of being crowded in slums, they would live in the cool valleys back of the city, from which deed restrictions now generally exclude them. Instead of seeing their children admitted to the best schools only in token numbers, they would enjoy all the emoluments of the ruling class. In hundreds of ways even the "good" Japanese would gain, not lose, by Japanese rule of Hawaii.

Nor are they unaware of these facts. In impressive numbers they fail to burn their bridges to Japan. Despite the numerous campaigns for renunciation of Japanese allegiance, there are still 60,000 dual citizens in Hawaii —in other words, the majority of American-born Japa-

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nese in Hawaii are willing to let the Japanese government claim them as its own. Some 15,000 Hawaiian-born Japanese have cast their lot permanently with Japan. Thousands of others shuttle between Tokyo and Honolulu, "taking my father's ashes to his homeland," seeking better jobs, or simply taking advantage of the low steamship rates through which Japan keeps in touch with its foreign colonies.

Only a Pollyanna could conclude that there is no danger in this situation. If only because it hides the emperor's agents, this large unassimilated group constitutes a real menace. Nor are the professional saboteurs who escape the FBI the only ones who would act with zest if they found themselves in a position to swing the balance against the United States forces. There are also congenital white-man haters (*haole*-haters in the island vernacular) among both the alien and citizen Japanese. The most innocuous *papa-san* could easily become their dupe. I do not say he will; the point is that we cannot be sure he will not. With no better material the emperor's men certainly welded efficient fifth columns in the Philippines, in Malaya, and in the Dutch East Indies. (There is another side to the coin, and in a happier time I would rather be polishing it—it presents the Hawaiianization of Japanese who can never be Americanized, for instance, and the human qualities which we must admire in these fine people whether they happen to be on our side or not.)

People who have been interned do not buy theater tickets or serve cocktails, and some islanders have argued that this is not the time to disturb matters in civilian Honolulu. Hawaii's Congressional delegate, Sam King, has worked assiduously to convince both Congress and the military that nothing should be done beyond apprehending known spies and treacherous ringleaders. Everywhere one hears repeated the testimony of Captain John Anthony Burns of the Honolulu police force that he has found the accounts of sniping at American soldiers untrue, and the touching story of Yoshio Yamamoto, who saves all his pennies for war stamps. Everywhere people emphasize that the Japanese are indispensable in Hawaii. But many of these are interested persons who overlook the Buddhist temples, the Japanese-language schools, the dozens of Japanese societies and organizations, some with official Tokyo connections, the ubiquitous pictures of the emperor, the Japanese holidays, the crowds flocking to see the emperor's cruisers, the subscriptions to Japanese war loans, the strongly nationalistic propaganda uncovered in Japanese-language publications.

The argument of Japanese indispensability, the one that has been dinned into the ears of Congress and the military authorities, is a fallacious one. It would be inconvenient to get along without the Japanese, but it would not be impossible. The Filipino has long been the backbone of the plantation labor supply, and there are thousands of Chinese, Hawaiians, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, and Caucasians to carry on essential functions. If the plantations should stop raising sugar and pineapples, which they would be forced to do during a long siege, there would be an over-supply of labor. Conversion to food crops has not taken place in Hawaii to the extent always thought necessary.

One articulate group in Hawaii advocates internment of the Japanese. The leaders of this group are life-long islanders, some of whom were raised with the Japanese and speak their language. Those I know are not given to jitters, and when they say that the absence of sabotage on December 7 proves nothing, I agree with them. If Japan has a well-organized fifth column in Hawaii it would certainly not have exposed it prematurely, before any effort was to be made at invasion, and when the saboteurs could have accomplished nothing but their own extinction.

I cannot agree, however, that large-scale internment of Hawaii's Japanese would be wise. Not only would internment be sure to cause great hardship, but it would be ineffective in one particular—in getting out of the invader's reach a large and competent reservoir of manpower which could be depended on to carry on civilian life in the islands. For whatever doubt there may be about the attitude of the Japanese before or during an invasion attempt, there is no doubt that the vast majority of Hawaii's Japanese will work with alacrity with the emperor's forces if Japan ever takes the islands. I favor evacuation, which would (1) remove this labor force, (2) bring less hardship, and (3) reduce Hawaii's consumption of food, much of which is convoyed from California. Since ships return from Hawaii with only sugar and pineapples, which we can forgo momentarily, plenty of bottoms are available for the purpose.

We should not underestimate the importance of what we are gambling. Hawaii consists of seven islands—only one of them fortified—as against the 2,500 islands of Micronesia; it is virtually our only neutralizing agent for the vast insular system of "stationary aircraft carriers" that projects Japanese power south to the Equator and east to within bombing distance of Honolulu. Hawaii is indispensable to us if we are to protect our flanks in the Antipodes and Alaska, safeguard the Panama Canal and our West Coast, and eventually carry out a frontal attack on Japan. Without it we should be impotent in the Pacific.

If it was expedient to remove a scattering of Japanese from our Western coastal regions, the American people should be told why it is not many times more necessary to remove this heavier concentration of Japanese from islands which are in greater danger and harder to defend. We are playing for the highest stakes: Congress should investigate immediately and tell us what the odds are.

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Hitler's Quarreling Puppets

BY EUGEN KOVACS

DURING the critical period on the eastern front which preceded the present German offensive Adolf Hitler found time to go to Finland for a talk with Field Marshal Mannerheim. The reason given for his visit was that Herr Hitler wished personally to congratulate the Finnish leader on his seventy-fifth birthday. It is generally believed, however, that Hitler went to beg Mannerheim to contribute more troops to the war against Russia. Heretofore when the Führer has wanted something from the head of one of the "independent" states now allied to Germany, he has ordered his ally to come to him, but on this occasion he evidently thought it necessary to use gentler methods. What answer Mannerheim gave him is unknown, but there have been no signs of increased effort on the part of the Finns.

The Russian war has been very costly, and the new offensive is a tremendous drain on German man-power. Large numbers of troops must also be maintained in other parts of Europe to keep down underground activity, combat the Serbian guerrillas, and be prepared for an Anglo-American invasion of the Continent. At the same time the great need for war materials and foodstuffs calls for more and more men on the production front. Hitler is therefore asking for increased military support from his so-called allies, and since Italy is neither willing nor able to take part in the Russian war on a large scale, he is seeking fresh troops not only from the Finns but from the Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Croatians, and Slovaks. The answers he has received from the peoples of Southeastern Europe show that they do not intend to increase the aid they have already granted.

Their attitude surprises no one who has lived among them. The support they have given Hitler has always been compulsory and half-hearted. How small it really has been is revealed by the German communiqués, which from January 1 to July 15, 1942, have mentioned the Rumanians thirty-six times, the Hungarians thirteen times, the Slovaks and Croats five times each.

From the beginning these allies of Hitler's formed a strange and unnatural group. Most of them have always been arch-enemies. They joined in the war against Russia—and against Yugoslavia and Greece—only in the hope that they could thereby realize their own national aims. Now that the war has left their borders and the danger of a Russian invasion is past, they consider their part in it finished and are returning to their own national politics. The accounts they wish to settle are not with the Russians but with one another. All of them are pressing Hitler to fulfil the promises he made to them a year ago. But Hitler is in a bad position and has to postpone fulfilment. As a result these countries are preparing for a direct settlement, and Hitler has his hands full preventing war between Rumania and Hungary, Hungary and Slovakia, or Rumania and Bulgaria.

In his original plan of strategy against Russia, formulated in August, 1941, Hitler reserved an important role for the Hungarian army—the defense of the Carpathian Mountains. The partition of Transylvania, which gave the northern part of that province to Hungary, was in preparation for this. But the war against Russia was very unpopular in Hungary. It had been necessary to blame the Soviets for the bombing of the town of Kassa in order to find a pretext for a declaration of war against them. The Hungarian army participated only on a small scale, preferring to remain on the Rumanian and Slovakian borders and to hold the Bácska, which was "retaken" from Yugoslavia in spite of a pact of "eternal friendship." The former Hungarian Premier, Ladislas de Bárdossy, declared in Parliament that his country would not increase the "expeditionary army" against the Russians, and his successor, Nicholas de Kállay, has made every effort to hold to that position. On his recent visit to Hitler he is reported to have said that Hungary needed its man-power for the harvest and to have offered grain instead of men. The government has been wholeheartedly supported by both Regent Horthy and the Hungarian aristocracy, which, though long notorious in Europe for its anti-democratic and fascist sentiments, is in the main anti-Hitler because it fears that after the Führer is victorious and no longer needs the support of the great landowners, he will advocate expropriation of the estates.

Hungarian policy is clear: Hungary wants to keep the former Hungarian territories "reconquered" from the Czechs in 1938 and from the Yugoslavs in 1941, and also that part of Transylvania which was retroceded by Rumania after Ribbentrop and Ciano worked out the Vienna award in 1941. But Hungary remembers its experience in 1918-19, when, its army having been destroyed, it had to submit not only to the dictates of the Allies but also to a Rumanian invasion and the occupation of Budapest. It refuses to repeat the mistakes of the last war and to sacrifice its youth in the cause of Germany. It remembers how, "*mitgegangen, mitgefangen,*

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mitgehangen," it had to share the fate of its allies and take full punishment.

Today Hungary is saving its army and its ammunition for the post-war crisis. Its position was made plain when Kállay, an intimate friend of the well-known anti-Nazi Count Stephen Bethlen, was appointed Premier to succeed Bárdossy, and when the son of the anti-Hitler Horthy was chosen to be his father's successor.

Relations between Hungary and Rumania are strained to the breaking-point. I was in Rumania when the present regime had to carry out the Vienna award and cede to Hungary half of Transylvania, "the pearl of Greater Rumania," with its capital, Cluj-Kolozsvár. I had also witnessed the return of Bessarabia to the Russians. The resolution of the Rumanian-Russian question without a war was welcomed by the people. Everybody was aware that Bessarabia was not worth fighting for, and no serious accusations were made against the government which ceded it. But when northern Transylvania and Cluj were to be evacuated, the bitterness was universal, and only the critical internal political situation—the revolt of the Iron Guard, the dethronement of King Carol, and the installation of the Antonescu regime—prevented open revolution. The anti-Hitler feeling then created grew stronger when the German "instruction troops" arrived and Rumania was prepared to become the battlefield of the campaign against Russia.

General Antonescu, Rumania's present dictator, is a soldier and only a soldier; he has had no political experience and cannot command the support of politicians. All his life he has been preparing for a Rumanian-Russian war, and as soon as Hitler made him "commander of the Rumanian-German armies operating in the south," he ignored the warnings of his advisers and sent his army into battle. Bessarabia was not worth the losses incurred, and generals as well as politicians are protesting against the cost of the dictator's military adventure.

Under pressure of Rumanian public opinion Antonescu presented his claims for a revision of the Vienna award. Hitler refused to discuss the Transylvanian question at that time. Meanwhile, clear-sighted persons in Rumania knew that while the country was being bled white for Germany, the Hungarians were fortifying their positions in Transylvania and had even gone so far as to ask for the second half of that province. Opposition to the continuation of the Russian war became more serious in view of Hungary's preparations. Two "secret" radio stations were set up on Rumanian soil to carry on anti-Hungarian propaganda among the Rumanian minority in Hungarian Transylvania.

Antonescu called on Hitler and brought back only new obligations to deliver more troops, food, and oil to the Führer. People are hungry and cold in a wheat-growing, richly forested country; the army's losses have been heavy; and nothing has been gained. The Rumanian nation is becoming impatient and is asking for an immediate solution of the Transylvanian question. If Hitler can do nothing, Rumania will refuse further help to the Axis. Dissatisfaction is great and open; both people and politicians are demanding the withdrawal of Rumanian troops from Russia and their dispatch to the Hungarian border.

The Slovakians are also reluctant to augment Hitler's strength. Not only do they feel their kinship with other Slavs, but they are afraid of the Hungarians. Hungary claims part of Slovakia in addition to those sections of Czecho-Slovakia which it seized in 1938. The troops of the two countries now face each other on the border and refuse to leave their positions to fight against the Russians.

The autonomous Croatia created by the Germans and placed under the leadership of Ante Pavelich is another "ally" of Hitler's. But not even the terror of the Ustashis (the organization responsible for the assassination of King Alexander) can break the influence of Vladimir Machek there. Although the Croat peasant leader is confined to his country estate in Kubinec, his followers are carrying on the struggle against Pavelich in his name. The king-killer has succeeded in gathering a number of Machek's followers into his so-called parliament, but the spokesman of the group has declared that only the "utmost terror" forced them to come. The Duke of Spoleto, the new "King of Croatia," does not dare to appear in Zagreb for fear of an attempt on his life. Rather than fight for Hitler, peasants are enrolling in the "green cadres," groups of deserters who in alliance with the Serb Chetniks are fighting against the Ustashis and the Italian and German occupation troops.

Bulgaria, like Hungary, is a victim of the First World War. From the beginning of the present conflict the Bulgarian press has never ceased to remind the people of the results of fighting a losing battle on the German side. "No war" is the Bulgarian watchword; "national claims must be satisfied by peaceful means." So far this policy has been successful. As a result of German pressure on Rumania Bulgaria got back the southern Dobrudja, and it has occupied parts of Yugoslavia and Greece that it has claimed for many generations. But it is unwilling to declare war on Slav Russia. It is fighting against Serbian Chetniks and Greek guerrillas, but exclusively on territory which it has occupied, and it has refused to furnish any military help to Hitler against Russia.

The firm stand taken by these countries reveals Hitler's weakness. If he were as strong as he boasted he was at the beginning of the Russian-German war, they would not have the courage to oppose his wishes. They are in a position to know the situation and chances better than more remote countries, and they have made their decision.

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Everybody's Business

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

Too Much Wheat

OUT in the wheat belt the combines are humming as harvesting gets into full swing. Weather conditions during the growing season have been favorable, and there is a bumper crop to gather in, even though it will not quite measure up to last year's output. For this small mercy the Department of Agriculture may truly be thankful, since it is already almost smothered in wheat. At the beginning of the new "crop year" on July 1 there was a carry-over from previous harvests of 630,000,000 bushels. Add the estimated yield of this year's crop—868,059,000 bushels—and we have a supply equal to two years' domestic consumption with no important export outlets in sight so long as the war continues.

One result is a major storage problem. This week, with storage facilities at the terminal exhausted and with grain tying up badly needed railroad cars in the freight yards, the Kansas City Board of Trade voted a modified embargo on wheat shipments. In other terminal cities the situation is almost equally difficult, with last year's carry-over filling up the elevators. From all over the wheat belt come stories of farmers turning to all sorts of makeshifts in order to house their crops. Garages, vacant stores, and schoolhouses are being boarded up and used for storage. Even farmhouse parlors are being emptied of furniture to make room for wheat.

Despite this superabundance, only after a prolonged and bitter fight has the government obtained from Congress authority to sell some of its wheat holdings for animal feed at a price sufficiently below parity to make it competitive with corn. And it is permitted to dispose of no more than 125,000,000 bushels in this manner. Yet while our daily bread is more than amply assured, there is a real need to bolster the production of the protein foods which animals "manufacture" from grain—meat, eggs, and dairy products. In view of increased military and civilian demands and our lend-lease commitments, supplies of these commodities are none too plentiful. A near-crisis in pork is impending, with hogs commanding a market price far above the parity level and the processors, who operate under a price ceiling, becoming reluctant to buy. Increased supplies of feed will help to correct this situation.

Even before the farm bloc had suffered final defeat in its effort to prevent the sale of wheat below parity, it had a new inflationary iron in the fire. A bill has passed the Senate ordering 100 per cent parity loans on 1942 crops of wheat, cotton, corn, rice, peanuts, and tobacco. The passage last summer of the Steagal amendment providing for 85 per cent parity loans on basic crops gave a strong impetus to the upward movement in farm prices. Should this new bill become law, another rise in the cost of living can be confidently expected. In the case of wheat it will mean a price of 134.4 cents a bushel compared with an average price to the farmer in June of 96 cents.

Moreover, we have to consider the effect of such a bonanza price on the wheat grower. Encouraged to expect that the same bounty will be extended to him in respect of next year's crop, he will naturally try to increase his output. It is true that wheat-acreage allotment for 1943 is restricted to the legal limit—55,000,000 acres—as it was in the current year, but a full parity price will make it worth while to intensify production by using more fertilizer. Nor will the farmer be so apt to listen to Secretary of Agriculture Wickard's plea to turn suitable land from wheat to more urgently needed crops. Thus if the Senate bill is passed, labor, machinery, and fertilizers which could have been used in more fruitful ways will be employed to add to an already unmanageable surplus of wheat. Under war-time conditions waste of resources of this kind is worse than a blunder; it is treason.

By pushing demands which not only ignore the national interest but violate common sense the farm bloc is endangering the whole agricultural program, as indeed many farmers and farm organizations recognize. Few will deny the basic justice of the parity idea. But it is one thing to seek ways of guaranteeing the farmers a fair share of the national income and something else to attempt to freeze the crop pattern by protecting the production of obviously superfluous quantities of a particular commodity such as wheat.

Price guaranties and subsidies can be justified only when they seek to correct, and not to distort, an unbalanced supply-demand situation. Thus government underwriting of profitable prices for meat or soy beans or peanuts can be defended at this time on the ground that prospective supplies of these crops are inadequate. But to spur the production of wheat is about as sensible as closing the sluice gates of an overflowing reservoir. Intelligible aid to wheat farmers would be directed toward getting them away from wheat and into some of the many other crops for which there is an increasing demand, especially those which are the raw materials for the new chemurgic industries. These offer prospects for post-war development. When peace comes, there will be a relief demand of great magnitude which may provide a way of reducing wheat stocks to normal proportions, although we must not forget that Canada and the Argentine also possess very large reserves. It is highly improbable, however, that we shall permanently regain the export markets without which the present acreage devoted to wheat must be excessive.

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In the Wind

THE FOUR FREEDOMS" is the title of a documentary motion picture just issued by the National Association of Manufacturers. The last of the President's four freedoms, "freedom from fear," is changed in the film to "freedom of enterprise."

AMONG THE GUESTS at a recent reception for Mr. and Mrs. Joseph E. Davies were Mr. and Mrs. Martin Dies and Hjalmar Procope, Finnish minister to the United States.

IN AN EDITORIAL on the fall of Sevastopol, the Green Bay (Wisconsin) *Press-Gazette* compared the resistance of the Russians with that of the besieged fascists "when the Republicans defended the Alhambra against the reds" in the Spanish war.

MANY VENDORS who used to hawk *Social Justice* are now selling *Serve America Now,* a new fascist-flavored magazine published in Boston.

GERALD L. K. SMITH is short of funds. In a circular letter to his supporters he says that his organization, the Committee of One Million, and his campaign for the Senate may both fail unless he gets the money to pay many long-outstanding bills.

JAMES E. CURLEY, three times mayor of Boston and once governor of Massachusetts, is opposing Representative Thomas Eliot in the Democratic primaries. Curley has a powerful machine and is popular with Irish elements in Boston who form a large part of the liberal incumbent's constituency.

REPRESENTATIVE HAROLD KNUTSON, in his column in the Brainerd (Minnesota) *Dispatch,* discussed last week the Dies committee's accusations against the Union for Democratic Action. Knutson cited a great many facts about U. D. A. leaders which in his opinion prove it is an alien group. His comment on Dr. James Loeb, executive secretary of the Union, was that Loeb formerly taught Romance languages.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY of Russia, what remains of it, now has its headquarters in New York. The war, however, is breaking it up, for several prominent Mensheviks are becoming increasingly sympathetic to the Bolsheviks. One of these is Max Werner, the military analyst. Werner spoke recently at a Communist-led meeting, and the Mensheviks decided to expel him. When two other leaders of the group, A. Yugow and Theodor Dan, supported him, they also were expelled.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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H E A R

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BOOKS and the ARTS

"P'town"

TIME AND THE TOWN: A PROVINCETOWN CHRONICLE. By Mary Heaton Vorse. The Dial Press. $3.50.

AN AMPHIBIAN creature snugly nestled within the almost closed fist of Cape Cod, Provincetown is one of the youngest of Mother Plymouth's daughters, and by reputation at least the "fastest" and least prim from birth. Long ago, so legend has it, the devil had business with Captain Jeremiah Snaggs, a sinner from down-Cape, and after some difficulty ran him down in Provincetown.

"Well," said the Captain, "you caught me fair and square. Where do we go from here?"

"Go?" exclaimed His Nibs, a bit surprised. "Ain't we to Provincetown?"

Almost any and every attitude can be taken toward the town except indifference. People either love it passionately or hate it with equal fervor. Mary Heaton Vorse belongs to the first school, and her story of "P'town" is tender and understanding, with many deep insights born of an intuitive "feel" for things that cannot easily be explained. The mellow light of wisdom and sparkling flash of wit play over these pages, which are rich with amusing and revealing anecdote, illuminating more with a phrase than ten pages of ponderous analysis.

They are all here, all the diverse and jangling elements that have made Provincetown one of the most distinctive of American communities—the old-time whaling fleet, the Grand Bankers, the mooncussers, the Coast Guard, the fresh fishermen and weir fishermen, the "freezers" and beam trawlers, the scientists, writers, rum-runners, sculptors and painters, Lizzie Jazz Garters, boarding-house keepers, tin-horn politicians, crabapple Yankees, prolific Portuguese from ancient Lisbon and the Azores, Nova Scotians, "bohemians" (high and low), and the castellated "girls" of the Research (genealogical) Society, restricted to Mayflower descendants. Almost all claim at least one line of descent from Stephen Hopkins, rather ironically, for Hopkins was the most democratic of the Pilgrim Fathers, being constantly in trouble with the Plymouth authorities, twice for selling liquor without a license and once for inviting servants into his house to drink and play shovelboard, which the Research Society has yet to do.

Mary Heaton Vorse is at her best in telling the story of her early years in Provincetown, from 1907 to 1917, before automobiles and three-hour tourists came to clog its two long narrow streets and its maze of narrower cross lanes. Her description of the old Kibbe Cook house, which has been her home for thirty-five years, is a fine and sensitive piece of writing.

While the story has been told before and at greater length, there is interesting material here on the now almost legendary Provincetown Players, who presented their first plays on the Vorses' old fish wharf, long since fallen into the sea. Never since the days of Emerson, Thoreau, and their friends at Concord has there been such fruitful joint activity on these shores. Of Provincetown for a few brief years it can be said, as was inscribed with a burning iron on the door of the old stable in MacDougal Street that became the Provincetown Playhouse, "Here Pegasus was hitched."

Probably because the pattern of life at Provincetown, as elsewhere in the country, began to fall apart into rather meaningless pieces after the last war, the chronicle is not so rewarding in its final sections. It becomes somewhat too miscellaneous, quite out of focus here and there where it descends to a mere cataloguing of personalities, events, "quaint" industries, and who lives where. More than one of the later chapters might well have been telescoped to a paragraph or two. The space might better have been used by Mary Heaton Vorse to probe into the most puzzling and disheartening phenomenon of the town—the wide and as yet unbridged gap between persons like herself and the general run of the town. Writers, painters, and "thinkers" have never been accepted locally. This question goes deep, to the very roots of the community and, for that matter, of American life. There is a deadly parallel in the history of all American "art" colonies. Why do such communities dry up so rapidly? Can it be because the artists and writers are really little better than three-hour tourists, having their function elsewhere, drawing their bread and butter from outside, without roots in the local scene? Couldn't they dig in and sprout roots if they tried, instead of always living spiritually in New York or some other metropolis? After all, the painters of Siena did not commute either physically or spiritually to Florence, Venice, or Rome. They lived and painted in Siena, for the Sienese.

Whatever the cause, writers and painters have never made the grade in Provincetown, and this unquestionably has affected their work by constricting their lives. "Ma" Enos summed up the popular feeling about them when her husband, Captain "Kitty," took up art, decorating clam and quahog shells, even painting rather charming canvases, after he had been stove up by a fall from a roof.

"Go'dammit!" said Ma, "it's awful! Lucky, though, he fell off the right side of the roof. If he'da come down the left side, he might'a been one of them —— —— —— writers."

GEORGE WILLISON

Textbook of Blitzkrieg

ATTACK: A STUDY OF BLITZKRIEG TACTICS. By Major F. O. Miksche. With an Introduction by Tom Wintringham. Random House. $2.50.

TOM WINTRINGHAM, in his introduction to "Attack," describes Major Miksche's work as a textbook of modern war, and the only textbook he knows that deals with war as the Germans have shaped it and are shaping it. He and Major Miksche served together with the Interna-

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tional Brigade of the Spanish Republican army through the war in Spain, where they fought the German army specialists who made use of this campaign to try out their modern battle tactics and who incidentally gained much knowledge which they were later able to apply in Poland and France.

The German conception of war is to be found in the teachings of General Karl von Clausewitz, the military theorist who directed the Prussian War School in the early nineteenth century. The modern German army had its origin in the period when universal military service was adopted in Prussia; Hitler and his military advisers have built their war machine on the sound foundations of the old army and their strategy of conquest on the teachings of the Prussian War School. Clausewitz laid down that the military aims of conquest must be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the seizure of his means of aggression, that is, his raw materials, food, and industry. The final aim must be to overcome his will to resist; this is usually accomplished by a great victory in the field and the capture of his capital.

Only a small portion of "Attack" is devoted to the historical background of the Nazi system of aggressive warfare, but the evolution of this system through the Spanish and Polish campaigns is carefully traced. In the former the Germans learned much and the French little, and Major Miksche explains why the French failed to profit from the lessons of a campaign so near home.

The blitzkrieg, as tried out in Spain, started at too slow a pace, and there were many mistakes, though it is only fair to say that these were mostly made by the Italians. Toward the end of the war the pace quickened, and the technique of cooperation between tanks and aircraft was much improved. In the Polish campaign German operations assumed the rapidity of true blitzkrieg.

The story of the French campaign is well known, but Major Miksche has thrown new light on the reasons for the French miscalculation of German intentions. The campaign started with surprise, because the main attack was made not in the open plains of Belgium but through the Ardennes, by an approach averaging seventy miles a day. This was quite contrary to General Gamelin's ideas that no force could penetrate that region swiftly owing to its lack of roads and railways. The roads were too few for an army maintaining a broad front, but they were enough for an armored and motorized drive that pushed hard on narrow fronts and was not disturbed by gaps between those fronts. Surprise was achieved by speed, and success was exploited by keeping up the speed. The German Staff utilized the rapidity of modern road transport in cooperation with the airplane on a scale on which it had not been used before. Success in France was largely the result of practice in Spain and Poland. Since 1940, though new weapons and equipment have imposed some changes in method, the German principles of attack have remained the same.

Major Miksche has made a thorough study of the tactics of attack as perfected by the Germans on the battlefield. In Spain he was given one of the highest ranks bestowed on staff officers of foreign birth, and he organized the defensive system of the Republican army. By the end of the campaign it was clear to him that new weapons and methods had changed both attack and defense. The greater part of his book is given over to this subject, and it is one of much interest and moment, not only to soldiers, but to the people of all the Allied nations. H. S. SEWELL

Art Hays

CITY LAWYER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A LAW PRACTICE. By Arthur Garfield Hays. Simon and Schuster. $3.

THERE are few labor causes to which Arthur Garfield Hays has turned a cold shoulder. The reason is apparent in the foreword of his new book:

> My life is essentially a struggle . . . the usual one of making a living, and then making living a little easier for those who are the perennial victims of persecution. After a good many years of it, I am convinced that the struggle itself, whether temporarily won or lost, is what counts. To press for some cause bigger than oneself, however hopeless it may seem, isn't necessarily noble. It is just about the best fun there is in life for people of my disposition. . . . It may well be I have been worth more for the defense of the rights of others to express their ideas (with a great many of which I have not agreed) than for any other purpose.

However, it should be quickly added that his new book is not a polemic on liberalism or a dissertation on how to succeed in the law. For the most part it is a warm, informal, loosely knit account of the career of a man who enjoys his profession and enjoys writing about it.

As a fighter for liberalism, Mr. Hays is familiar to *Nation* readers. But this book presents him in a less familiar role, that of a successful practicing lawyer of international reputation. Perhaps that is why "City Lawyer" has so fresh a touch. He has recounted in great detail his non-political cases and kept his "cause" cases down to a minimum.

Subtitled "The Autobiography of a Law Practice" rather than the autobiography of a lawyer, the biographical details are played down; yet more of them appear here than in any of his other books. Born in Rochester, New York, in 1881, of a fairly well-to-do middle-class family, he came to New York City as a boy, attended City College, then Columbia, and was graduated from the Law School of that university. He passed the bar in 1905 and spent the summer in Europe on the usual grand tour. He entered a well-established, highly reputed law firm in New York's financial district but soon formed a partnership with S. Walter Kaufmann and Norvin R. Lindheim. Because of Kaufmann's German connections, the young firm received a great deal of work from German sources. In fact, Hays got his first taste of international law when he went to England to protest against the seizure of German goods by the English in the early years of the war. When he returned to America he found the United States at war with Germany and his law firm under accusation of aiding the enemy. The ensuing investigation—Hays personally was not involved—resulted in the conviction and disbarment of his partners, and it was not until many years later that they were reinstated.

Under the heading The Pictures on My Office Walls, Hays discusses the high lights in his career. His cases ranged

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from the defense of Wall Street brokerage firms to divorce and libel actions. Interspersed were his "liberal" cases—Sacco and Vanzetti, Robert Burns of "Georgia Chain Gang" fame, the Scopes trial, H. L. Mencken and the Watch and Ward Society of Boston, Mayor Hague of New Jersey, and many others. But he has reserved most space for a case that was without a tinge of "social significance"—the Wendel will case. The problem was to break the will of Ella Wendel and determine who were the lawful heirs. A reputed fifty million dollars was involved, and the law fee was a million. It is the best mystery story of the thirties, and why no one has written a novel using it as a background is an even greater mystery.

Another case to which Hays devotes a good deal of space is the Reichstag-fire trial, in which he sat in as an observer for the defense. More interesting than the trial itself are the details of how Hays got in and out of the case, especially his description of Nazi court procedure and of the treatment accorded him by the Nazi authorities. On the fire itself nothing has ever been written to equal the brilliant full-length account by Douglas Reed, published—and neglected—in this country in 1934 under the title "The Burning of the Reichstag." Reed, an English journalist, devoted an entire book to this sensational event; Hays sees it through the eyes of an American lawyer.

The layman may find Mr. Hays's book rather technical in spots, but in most instances the material is so interesting, and is presented so vividly, that the legal phraseology is forgivable. "City Lawyer" may not be Mr. Hays's most important book, but it is by far the most readable.

GEORGE JOEL

The Correspondent's Book

ASSIGNMENT TO BERLIN. By Harry W. Flannery. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.

ABOUT this much there is no argument: a radio correspondent upon his return from Berlin will have at least something of interest to say. And one may agree that if the correspondent has an alert mind and a terse biting style he should be encouraged to write a book. Mr. Shirer, for instance. But not Mr. Flannery. Mr. Flannery was good for a Town Hall luncheon or one article in some genteel, rather portentous magazine, the *Atlantic Monthly,* say. But there he is, an honest, rather sentimental man, "well-informed," diligent, soft-spoken, and slightly confused, clapped down by Mr. Knopf beside the ejaculator of exact and brilliant paragraphs. How do you do, Mr. Shirer!

There is, of course, plenty of information in "Assignment to Berlin." Much of it is about Mr. Flannery's not very exciting profession, about which Mr. Shirer has told us all we need to know. A radio correspondent will meet bureaucrats, censors, and officials; not very interesting creatures unless one is interested in the study of censorship for its own sake. It may be admitted that what a censor permits one to say, or what he prohibits, may throw light upon a government's plans. Mr. Flannery throws no light, however. He was exasperated by the German censors, who cooperated whole-heartedly with CBS's man only when they saw propaganda value in one of his stunts, such as interviewing a pugilist named Max Schmeling or one of the pilots alleged to have bombed the Illustrious. Then, again, Mr. Flannery is at pains to tell us that the incredible Mr. Wodehouse is a dangerous nitwit with a materialistic mind. And since he had not before traveled outside the United States, Mr. Flannery sets down a few of his, presumably, choicer impressions. German dark beer is sweeter than light beer, and Mr. Flannery did not like it. Also, German photographic films are inferior to American. Probably the famous American remark about European plumbing is to be found somewhere in the author's pages. Again, a little tenderness is called for by the recipe for this kind of book. Mr. Flannery therefore reports his telephone conversations with his wife back home in the States—four thousand miles away! Sometimes he had a good connection and at other times he did not. But modern science is wonderful, anyway.

But what kind of information can a correspondent gather? Gestapo vigilance cannot prevent his collecting exact data about the food situation. Mr. Flannery does something in this line. He can observe certain things of military value. The author gives us a few extremely interesting facts about the camouflage of Berlin, together with a rumor, popular in the German capital, that the Nazis have built a fake Berlin to deceive any British or Russian bomber pilot whose navigator chances to be dead drunk over his maps. An observer in the author's position may make a faithful report on the German press. We get a little of that. He may recount war-time gossip, though he should be careful not to let his gossip reporting become downright assertion. It is, for example, very probable that after the invasion of the U. S. S. R. dissension arose within the German military class. So much we had gathered back here. In any case, war-time chatter would busy itself with the theme. Since the matter is "of the essence," when Mr. Flannery states positively that the German army wanted more say in government, he ought to disclose his source of information. Upon all these subjects, then, Mr. Flannery has something to say, but never does he go after his theme and clinch his few instances with a well-ordered abundance of fact. Almost the only matter to be treated generously is German morale, the curious, anxiety-ridden grayness of mind characteristic at least of the middle-aged masses. For the rest he ambles along, rehashing material made public before or at the most spicing it with unimportant details.

The criticism, however, is not merely directed against a slightly lower than average "correspondent's book" but against the whole surfeit of them. Unless such a manuscript is written with the imagistic brilliance of Mr. Werth, or unless a historical curve shoots up out of it like a fiery rocket, as out of "Berlin Diary," there is only one characteristic that should earn it publication. A deadly, universal war is not merely a dubbed-in background for a display of chest-thumping in the manner of Tarzan Reynolds. Nor is it the occasion for a well-mannered conversation piece like Mr. Flannery's. What we do need is an abundance of relevant and exact information—but exact. The remark, which indicates satiety rather than ill-temper, is addressed to publishers, for their information and necessary action, please!

RALPH BATES

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Drama Note

THE current revivals of famous musical comedies at Carnegie Hall may not be brilliant as productions, but they provide a pleasantly nostalgic summer night's entertainment, especially for veterans of the first engagements of the old favorites. The scores seem as fresh as ever. The action, if that is how you describe what goes on in an old-school musical comedy, is slow in parts; other parts have been truncated, perhaps to speed things along but not always to the advantage of the production as a whole. Stage sets and costuming are economical but more effective, I thought, than some reviewers would admit. The casting is also so-so; adequate rather than first-rate.

In spite of this rather faint praise, nobody who would be likely to go to "The Chocolate Soldier" or "The Merry Widow" risks serious disappointment. The former played an extra week to good houses. "The Merry Widow," now running, has met with an equally enthusiastic response. Helen Gleason, who played the lead in both, has an excellent voice and is pretty besides. The role of Prince Damito in "The Merry Widow," made famous by the unforgotten Donald Brian, is sung with humor and spirit—though with an unnecessary touch of clowning—by Wilbur Evans, known in the past chiefly as a radio and concert singer. My memory may have exaggerated the glamour and gaiety of the final scene in Maxim's in the original performance, but I suspect that some of it has been ruthlessly deleted, perhaps in deference to Helen Gleason's very modest abilities as a dancer. Nor have the lines been improved by the injection of a few topical witticisms. But no impious hand has touched the Lehar score, and that, after all, is more important than action or words, scenery or costumes. F. K.

MUSIC

HERBERT GRAF, the Metropolitan's stage director, has written a book called "The Opera and Its Future in America" (Norton; $4.75). For the simpler-minded who think that opera is a number of exciting works by Mozart, Verdi, Wagner, Mussorgsky, its future is obvious enough: the best possible performances of these works to satisfy the interest of those who are excited by them, and to stimulate the imaginations of the creators of new works. But for Mr. Graf, who has the German tendency to intellectualization and schematization, the future of opera is the future of "the eternal musical theater," of which the opera of the past three hundred years is one of the particular forms determined by "particular social, political, and cultural surroundings." The true musical theater, in which "all arts—poetry, music, the dance, painting, sculpture, and architecture . . . worked together as a perfect ensemble in the service of a common purpose," was the democratic folk theater of the Greeks, which represented folk emotion about subjects close to the folk mind and heart, and represented the need for community participation, as one can see in the architectural form of the theater, which created no distinctions in the audience and did not separate the audience from the performers. Hence the seventeenth-century Italians who set out to reproduce the Greek drama were doomed to failure from the start, since what they produced represented not folk emotion but the mere intellectual interest of aristocrats, not the need of community participation but an aristocratic society's desire for mere entertainment, as was evident in the fact that the works were performed in palace theaters in which the audience was separated from the performers. And later came the performances in public theaters in which the tiers of boxes and seats separated the different classes of the audience; performances of works which the desire for entertainment made into "medley[s] of independent attractions: singing for the sake of vocal display, dancing to show off feats of virtuosity in bodily movement, scenery for the sake of mere pomp and color." It was liberal and democratic tendencies that changed all this: the Age of Reason produced Gluck's simplification of grand opera; Mozart's sensitiveness to the political currents of his time led him to a democratization of grand opera through the infusion of elements of folk opera—the every-day, true-to-life subjects close to the mind and heart of the folk, and calling for a more natural style of singing, acting, scenery, and so on. Beethoven, Verdi did the same thing; Wagner too used subjects from the history and mythology of his own people in works that employed all the elements of the stage in the service of "social document[s] of folk expression"; and he also integrated these elements in performances of the works. But in the end Mr. Graf is not satisfied with even perfect performances of Mozart or Wagner if proscenium arch and curtain separate audience from performers, if tiers of boxes and seats separate groups of the audience, if this audience is not the folk.

So with America. It was, he says, the moneyed aristocracy who, for their entertainment and social prestige, imported and supported in copies of the European court theaters the alien art of grand opera in foreign languages that had no "broad basis of support in the masses of the people." "In 1929 the wealth of the country was sucked into the maelstrom of financial depression"; and opera passed from the hands of those who no longer could afford to support it to the hands of new sponsors —the people. The result was its democratization: performances were broadcast to the entire nation; "the boxes in the grand tier, which had belonged to the stockholders of the [Metropolitan] Real Estate Company, were replaced by seats . . . a step toward widening the opera's appeal and bases of support"; "the great age of foreign opera in its original form, produced with the most famous casts and elaborate effects which could be bought in all the world, and presented by a skilful organization" ended; already there has been increasing use of American singers, a beginning with the use of English; and these point toward the future that Mr. Graf wants: an opera of the people in a theater of the people, employing subjects, a language, a style of performance that will engage their emotions.

The replacement of grand tier boxes by seats costing $5 represents perfectly the Metropolitan's democratization; Mr. Graf's citing of it represents equally well the writing in his book—superficial, remote from reality, inaccurate, uncritical, and this even in artistic matters. The Metropolitan was not democratized: the people contributed the funds to continue the performances and buy the opera house, but the moneyed aristocrats rented the parterre boxes they had owned and remained the directors of the producing company. And its artistic improvement has been in the direction of the recent performances of "Don Giovanni" and "Fidelio" in their original forms with the best available singers, mostly foreigners. For while such opera may originally have been imported by the moneyed aristocracy, it engaged and still engages the emotions of the musical public; and it will continue to do so.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

Democracy Is Indivisible

Dear Sirs: In his *Nation* article of June 20, Mr. del Vayo reminded us, as Ferrero and others have done, of the Congress of Vienna and the attempt made there to reconstruct Europe on the old principle of monarchist legitimacy, "the eternal law," as Metternich called it. The parallel between that congress and the future peace conference, after Allied victory, is indeed striking. Like the congress, the peace conference will follow a revolutionary period that produced dictators attempting to unify Europe by conquest.

The peacemakers of Vienna were out of step with history. They did not understand that the old principle of monarchist legitimacy had been finally replaced, in the revolutionary struggles, by a new principle—the principle of the Rights of Man. This, in fact, was a descent from heaven to earth; it was a change from a political principle based on divine right to one based on human rights.

Against this new principle the privileged fought step by step. Paradoxically, they were able to use the new nationalism created by the revolutions to postpone social and political reforms. The new nationalism built up psychological Chinese walls between the peoples, high enough to prevent them from seeing their common interests, but not so high as to stop vested interests from pursuing, in international accord, a counter-revolutionary policy. Nothing is more typical of this than the wishful belief, often expressed in reactionary circles, that Soviet Russia is going back to nationalism. It is in line with the policy that put Hitler in the saddle and finally led to the anti-Communist Munich agreement and the present war.

The next peace conference should clearly establish the new principle as the only source of political authority. It must be universally accepted, as was the previous principle of the divine right of kings. Naturally, different forms of government can be adopted, according to the educational level and the political evolution of the various peoples, but other wars are inevitable if a general principle of political authority is not established, if democratic solidarity does not become an almost religious need, taking precedence over nationalism.

The British-Russian pact, by creating the basis for a real understanding between the Western democracies and Soviet Russia, opens the road toward a "people's peace." But before that goal is reached, political clarification inside the Western democracies must take place. Declarations like the recent addresses of Messrs. Wallace and Welles clearly point the way. Of course the elimination of the men who believed in appeasement, who, as Mr. del Vayo puts it, may be considered "a useful element of counterpoise in a Europe which tomorrow might swing too far to the left," is indispensable. Without it, the threat of "counter-revolution" after the victory has been won will keep alive Soviet suspicion of the Western powers, and the result will be another peace based on the balance of power and another war.

Naturally the argument of the appeasers is the danger of communism or even of socialism. But labels are very confusing. Where, for instance, does a progressive trend, as exemplified by the New Deal, end and socialism begin? The difference lies rather between Anglo-Saxon pragmatism and European dogmatism. If the British-Russian treaty bears all its fruit, the Soviet Union will have no reason to deny its peoples the complete enjoyment of the Four Freedoms. It had a justification for not doing so only in the past, when anti-Communist coalitions were possible. What is essential is that we all understand that the "people's revolution" must be directed and organized by international democracy. This will be the paramount task of the future peacemakers. It implies the revision of the traditional conception of national sovereignty that paralyzed the first League of Nations. A limit must be set to the sovereignty of the state in order to protect the sovereignty of the people.

CHARLES A. DAVILA,
Former Rumanian Minister to Washington

New York, July 13

Balance of Power a Necessity

Dear Sirs: With the Anglo-Russian pact the very principle which Mr. del Vayo condemns has now been reasserted by the chief exponent of a people's revolution. For the balance of power is bred not by design but necessity. In the twentieth century it has been the logical response of countries with the one basic common interest of self-preservation to Germany's ceaseless megalomania.

Nor does it rule out hope of a wider system of security. But this, too, must deal with that contest of power which is the underlying reality of politics. Russia and Britain have framed specific guaranties of "mutual assistance" against Germany so that power may rest in the hands of the law-abiding—in the hands, that is, of any larger organization which they underwrite. Will these allies—together with France and the other liberated nations—have the economic stability thus to keep Europe's peace? The United States, in the interest of its own security, must take steps to make that possible. If the great anti-Axis combination is assured of a favorable balance of European power, it may be able to direct that power toward a better world.

Mr. del Vayo's account of pre-war diplomacy gives pause. For in Britain, at any rate, the government did not pursue what he thinks was a traditional policy of balance of power but the precise and tragic reverse. By acquiescing in the growth of German strength, the method employed was not that of balance but of unbalance.

For the ideological version always portrays Downing Street and the City magnates as being much less stupid than they were. It omits the fact that since the 1920's Germany had been among all classes of Englishmen the most popular of European countries. Many on the right detested not only Communist Russia but the French right and center; it was to be Blum and not Barthou who took his orders from London. Liberal England and czarist Russia united against Germany's previous bid for power. If historical precedent had been followed, close ties would have been formed with both Moscow and Paris.

As for the left, it too helped discredit Versailles beyond reason or safety. Appeasement was its own revisionist doctrine borrowed and intensified. Chamberlain tried to invent a substitute for that balance of power which embodies the experience of the past. From this all parties may learn. For a policy which comes from the heart but ignores the head may be as disastrous as one which appears to spring from neither.

LIONEL GELBER

Toronto, July 9

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